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Michael: Criminal Procedure - The Elimination of Dismissals for Lack of Pr
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-The Elimination of Dismissals for Lack of Prosecution from Wyoming Intermediate Appeals. Wood v. City of Casper, 660
P.2d 1163 (Wyo. 1983).

On April 2, 1981, the Casper Municipal Court found Charles Wood guilty of reckless driving and leaving the scene of an accident. Wood filed a
notice of appeal in the municipal court and he perfected his appeal by filing
the notice, trial record, and docketing fee with the Natrona County District
Court. Wood filed his brief on May 29, 1981 and the City of Casper responded with a reply brief on July 29, 1981. Wood took no further action in either
the September or March terms of the district court. At no time during this
delay did the district court warn Wood that it could dismiss his appeal if he
did not request a date for oral argument within two court terms after the
briefs were filed.' On July 6, 1982, the City moved that the appeal be
dismissed because of Wood's failure to prosecute. The district court heard
arguments on the motion and dismissed the appeal.2 Wood appealed the
dismissal to the Wyoming Supreme Court and the court reversed.8 The
court held that the district court had no power to dismiss a perfected intermediate appeal because of an appellant's failure to prosecute; and even
if the district court had the power, it could not dismiss without first notifying the appellant, well before the dismissal hearing, of his duty to request a
date for oral argument. 4
One of the court's apparent holdings must be dictum. If a district court
has no power to dismiss an intermediate appeal for lack of prosecution,
then the court will never need to notify the appellant that he risks
dismissal. Conversely, if a district court can dismiss an intermediate appeal
for lack of prosecution as long as it gives the proper notice, then the power
to dismiss must persist. The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that the
court, in fact, held that district courts have no power whatsoever to dismiss
intermediate appeals for lack of prosecution. The notice holding was dictum. Additionally, this Note is intended to show that although the court
reversed Wood's dismissal under rules that no longer apply to intermediate
appeals, the decision still carries precedential weight under the brand-new
rules governing intermediate appeals: the Wyoming Rules of Appellate
Procedure for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction., Finally, this Note will
demonstrate that the court's holding made sense under the rules governing
the Wood appeal6 and makes continued sense under the Wyoming Rules of
Appellate Procedure for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction.
1. For a discussion of the source of the district court's power to dismiss Wood's appeal, see
infra note 7.
2. Wood v. City of Casper, 660 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Wyo. 1983).
3. Id.
4. The exact language of these two conflicting holdings is worth restating. The court announced: "When an appeal from a municipal court to a district court has been perfected
except for the setting of the case for argument by the district court there is no authority
for the district court to dismiss the case for lack of prosecution." Id. at 1165. Later in the
same paragraph the court stated: "[W]e hold that when an appeal has been perfected except for argument of the appeal the district court should set the case for argument, and it
has no authority to dismiss for lack of prosecution in the absence of reasonable notice
which would have the effect of advising the appellant that it is necessary that a hearing
[argument] be requested before the district court." Id.
5. The new rules became effective on Janr 1, 1983. W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 30.
6. The Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure and rule 23 of the Wyoming Rules of
Criminal Procedure for Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts controlled the Wood
appeal to the extent that they contained relevant rules. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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THE CASELAW

The Origin ofDismissalsfor Lack of Prosecution:City of Casperv. Wagner
The power of the district courts to dismiss intermediate appeals for
lack of prosecution is purely a product of Wyoming caselaw.7 The Wyoming
Supreme Court first upheld a district court's use of the dismissal sanction
in 1955 when it decided City of Casperv. Wagner.8 The case arose when the
Casper Municipal Court convicted Leo Wagner of drunken driving and fined him $100. Wagner filed a notice of appeal and the police justice released
him on his own recognizance without collecting the fine. Wagner perfected
his appeal to the district court but never returned to the police justice to
pay his fine. He failed to demand his trial de novo9 through four consecutive
terms of the district court and then filed a motion to discharge the conviction on the grounds that his appeal had not been tried within three district
court terms of his indictment.10 The district court, instead of discharging
Wagner's conviction, dismissed his appeal and upheld the fine. The court
based its dismissal upon Wagner's failure to prosecute
his appeal with
12
diligence. 1 The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.
Wagner was decided when the intermediate appeal process afforded an
appellant like Wagner a trial de novo in the district court.18 He could demand a jury 14 and present evidence as if no decision had been reached
below. The prosecutor had to prove his case again.' 5 The time-consuming
trials de novo were not restricted to appellants with major cases. Many of
the cases appealed to the district courts involved far less than the jurisdictional maximums of the inferior courts. 16 For example, the appellant in
State ex. rel. Suchta v. DistrictCourt of SheridanCounty made a timely demand for a jury trial when appealing a seventy-five dollar drunken driving
conviction. When the district court refused the request for a jury, the
Wyoming Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition preventing the
district court from proceeding without a jury.17 As much as it may have
7. Rule 14 of the Uniform Rules for District Courts expressly authorized district courts to
dismiss cases for lack of prosecution when no substantial action toward their disposition
occurred for six months after docketing. U.R.D.C. 14. Wood's two-term delay in requesting oral argument violated the six-month limit of rule 14 and the district court relied
upon the rule to dismiss Wood's appeal. 660 P.2d at 1165. Wood argued to the supreme
court that rule 14 applied only to original actions, not to appeals. Brief for Appellant at
13, Wood v. City of Casper, 660 P.2d 1163 (Wyo. 1983). The supreme court agreed with
Wood. 660 P.2d at 1166. Thus the only possible source of authority supporting the district
court's dismissal in Wood came from prior supreme court decisions authorizing the
dismissal of intermediate appeals for lack of prosecution.
8. 74 Wyo. 115, 284 P.2d 409 (1955).
9. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
10. 284 P.2d at 409.
11. Id. at 410.
12. Id. at 413.
13. Wyo. STAT. § 15-207 (1945). Rule 29 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure for
Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts repealed the trial de novo statute in 1975. W.R.
CR. P.J.C. 29.
14. See State v. Hungary, 75 Wyo. 423, 296 P.2d 506 (1956).
15. See id. at 508.
16. In 1955 the justice courts could try cases with maximum sentences of $100 plus six months confinement. Wyo. STAT. § 15-101 (1945). Today the justice courts can try misdemeanors that carry fines of $750 as well as six months in jail. Wyo. STAT. § 7-16-101
(1977). Municipal courts in first class cities are limited to three month sentences, just like
they were in 1955, but the possible fine has been increased from $100 to $200. Compare
Wyo. STAT. § 29-250 (1945) with Wyo. STAT. § 5-6-201 (1977).
17. 74 Wyo. 48, 283 P.2d 1023 (1955).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol19/iss1/17

2

Michael: Criminal Procedure - The Elimination of Dismissals for Lack of Pr
1984

CASE NOTES

pained the justices to order a jury trial for a seventy-five dollar appeal, they
recognized that the trial de novo statute controlled and that they had
"neither the privilege nor the power to ignore it."',, Given the protections
favoring appellants taking intermediate appeals, it is likely that the Wyoming Supreme Court approached the issues in Wagner with a bias against
further protections for appellants, especially if they might burden the
district courts.
A key issue in Wagner was whether the duty to request a date for the
trial de novo rested upon the appellant or upon the prosecutor. Since the
trial de novo process was adversarial, neither the supreme court nor the
parties considered that it might be the district court's duty to set a date on
its own initiative. 19 The supreme court decided that the appellant, Wagner,
should have requested a date for his trial de novo because the prosecutor
had already advanced the initial trial to conclusion.20 Moreover, since a
statute threatened the prosecutor with dismissal if he did not request an
original trial date within three court terms of the indictment, 2 1 the supreme
court reasoned that Wagner deserved dismissal because he did not2request
2
his trial de novo within three terms after he perfected his appeal.
The Wagner court's decision to uphold the dismissal sanction rested
upon more than a desire to balance the relative burdens of prosecutors and
appellants. The sanction was necessary to prevent appellants from intentionally delaying their appeals. The supreme court apparently believed that
Leo Wagner purposely delayed his request for his trial de novo so that he
could withhold payment of his fine as long as possible and then move to
have it discharged entirely. 2 Because the court already assumed that only
the appellant could set the date for trial de novo, it had to provide some
sanction to the district courts so they could force an appellant like Wagner
to proceed. The dismissal for lack of prosecution was such a sanction, and
Wagner was a prototypical case for its employment.
In summary, three logical steps prompted the Wagner court to
recognize an inherent power in the district courts to dismiss intermediate
appeals for lack of prosecution. First, the court decided that the adversarial
process required a party, rather than the district court, to request a date
for trial de novo. Second, because the system favored appellants, it made
sense that the appellants, rather than the prosecutors, be required to request a date. Finally, the dismissal sanction was necessary to force appellants to proceed in timely fashion.
Dismissalsfor Lack of ProsecutionReassessed: Shafsky v. City of Casper
The Wyoming Supreme Court reevaluated the dismissal for lack of prosecution in 1971 when it decided Shafsky v. City of Casper.14 In Shafsky, the
18. Id. at 1026.
19. 284 P.2d at 409.
20. Id. at 410.
21. Wyo. STAT. § 10-1313 (1945). Rule 45(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure
now provides that a prosecutor can be dismissed for unnecessary delay. It sets no fixed
time limit. W.R. CR. P. 45(b) (The supreme court superseded section 10-1313 of the
Wyoming Statutes via rule 45(b), W.R. Cr. P., under the authority of section 5-4-207 of
the Wyoming Statutes. Wyo. STAT. § 5-4-207 (1977)).
22. 284 P.2d at 413.
23. See id. at 410.
24. 487 P.2d 468 (Wyo. 1971).
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Casper Municipal Court convicted A. B.Shafsky of selling liquor to a minor
and sentenced him to ten days in the city jail. Shafsky perfected his appeal
to the district court and a year later filed a motion to quash the complaint.
The district court refused the motion and, significantly, reminded Shafsky
of his duty to request a date for his trial de novo. Shafsky did nothing for
two more years, prompting the district court to grant the prosecutor's motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution.25 The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, explaining that the intermediate appeal process
was
26
still based on the trial de novo and therefore Wagner controlled.
FairHearings on Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution:Mullen v.
City of Cheyenne
One year after Shafsky, the supreme court decided Mullen v. City of
Cheyenne.27 The case arose from David Mullen's November, 1968, conviction on a drunken driving charge. Mullen perfected an appeal from the
Cheyenne Municipal Court to the Laramie County District Court but made
no request for a trial de novo for over two years. The district court never
warned Mullen that he risked dismissal for failure to request a trial date,
nor did the court grant Mullen a hearing at which to explain his lack of
diligence. Instead, the court granted the prosecutor's motion to dismiss
after an ex parte hearing.2 8
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed.2 9 In so doing, the court did not
strike down the district court's power to dismiss the appeal for lack of prosecution; nor did the court require that the district court give Mullen the
kind of advance warning to proceed that Shafsky had received. Rather, the
supreme court ruled that a district court could not dismiss an appeal for
lack of prosecution unless it held
a hearing on the motion to dismiss at
30
which the appellant appeared.
Mullen was the first case in which the supreme court questioned the
assumption made in Wagner that only a party could initiate the, setting of
an appeal date. In dictum at the end of Mullen the court observed: "During
oral argument we were advised by counsel that these cases were not considered upon the calling of the docket. It appears to us that had they been
called [by the court] proper disposition could have been timely made." 3' In
the end, however, Mullen made no important changes in the district courts'
power to dismiss intermediate appeals for lack of prosecution. The
dismissals were still permitted, and district courts were not required to
warn appellants of their duty to request trial de novo dates. As long as the
district courts granted fair hearings on the motions to dismiss, they could
dismiss as a matter of discretion. Mullen represented the supreme court's
final opinion on the dismissal for lack of prosecution until the court addressed the Wood appeal in 1983.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at 472.
493 P.2d 1043 (Wyo. 1972).
Id.
Id. at 1044.
After reversing, the supreme court did not simply order the district court to hear
Mullen's arguments against dismissal. The court instead ordered the district court to
hear the entire appeal on the merits. See infra text accompanying note 31.
31. Id.
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Reforming Intermediate Appeals: Rule 23 of the Wyoming Rules of
CriminalProcedurefor Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts
On January 1, 1975, three years after Mullen, the Wyoming Supreme
Court adopted the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure for Justice of the
Peace and Municipal Courts (W.R.Cr.P.J.C.)32 Rule 23 of the new rules,
entitled "Appeal,' superseded the prior statutory law governing intermediate appeals.8 8 Rule 23(a) expressly eliminated the trials de novo and
provided that all appeals to the district courts would be tried on questions
of law. 4 Thus an appellant could no longer request a jury and present his
evidence again. Rule 23(d) provided that the appellant supply the district
court with the trial record and rule 23(f) permitted the appellant to submit a
brief.8 8 If an appellant could not show prejudicial error in the district court
his conviction was affirmed. Harmless error, defined by rule 23(g) as "[a]ny
error... which does not affect substantial rights," 86 could not support a
reversal. Rule 23 did not address the propriety of dismissals for lack of prosecution, nor did it assign the duty to set a date for oral argument to either
for
the appellant or the district court. 8In
7 fact, rule 23 made no provision
oral argument to the district court.
FurtherReform in IntermediateAppeals: The Wyoming Rules ofAppellate
Procedure
Intermediate appeals were solely governed by rule 23 for only three
years. In 1978 the supreme court replaced its own Supreme Court Rules
with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure (W.R.A.P.). 8 The court
intended the W.R.A.P. to govern intermediate appeals to the district
courts as well as appeals to the supreme court. Rule 1.01 states that "[a]ll
appeals to the district court and Supreme Court shall be governed by these
rules."8 9 Unfortunately, the W.R.A.P. did not expressly supersede rule 23,
and as a result attorneys received conflicting instructions for several procedures. 40 First, the rule 23 deadlines for submission of the trial record and
briefs conflicted with the W.R.A.P. deadlines. 41 Second, rules 6.01 and
6.02, W.R.A.P., implied that oral argument would normally be held, while
nothing in rule 23 mentioned oral argument. 42 Finally, rule 6.01 of the
W.R.A.P. provided that "[t]he clerk will notify counsel by mail or telephone
of cases set for hearing."'48 Rule 23, on the other hand, was silent on this
issue.
32. W.R. CR. P.J.C.
33. W.R. Ca. P.J.C. 23. Rule 27 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure for Courts of
Limited Jurisdiction expressly superseded rule 23 in 1983. W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 27.
34. W.R. CR. P.J.C. 23(a).

35. W.R. CR. P.J.C. 23(d), (f).
36. W.R. CR. P.J.C. 23(g).
37. The City did not dispute Wood's original riht to oral argument even though rule 23 made
no provision for it. See infra note 42 for a discussion of the court's reliance upon rule 6.01
of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, which implied the right to oral argument.
38. W.R.A.P. 27.
39. W.R.A.P. 1.01.
40. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 7, at 4-5 n.1.
41. Compare W.R. CR. P.J.C. 23(b), (d), (f)with W.R.A.P. 3.02, 5.06.
42. The supreme court solved rule 23's silence regarding oral argument by applying rule
6.01, W.R.A.P. The court held that before an appeal was docketed rule 23 governed proceedings, but after docketing the W.R.A.P. controlled. 660 P.2d at 1167. Thus rule 6.01,
which implied that all intermediate appeals would include oral arguments, governed the
appeal.
See infra6.01.
text accompanying note 52 for the complete text of rule 6.01.
43. Wood
W.R.A.P.
6.01.W.R.A.P.
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Recent Changes in IntermediateAppeals: The Wyoming Rules of Appellate
Procedurefor Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
The supreme court based its decision in Wood upon rule 23 and the
W.R.A.P. (as well as the case law) because the case arose under those rules.
A new set of rules, the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure for Courts
of Limited Jurisdiction (W.R.A.P.C.L.J.), superseded both rule 23 and the
W.R.A.P. while the court deliberated. 44 The new rules, which became effective on January 1, 1983, make several major changes in the intermediate
appeal process. First, rule 5.01 encourages the district judge to dispense
with briefs and instead decide an appeal on the trial record and a statement
of error filed by the appellant. 46 Second, rule 6 states that "[tihere shall be
no oral arguments of the appeal before the district court, unless the district
judge directs otherwise. ' 46 Third, the W.R.A.P.C.L.J. contain no section
comparable to rule 6.01 of the W.R.A.P. which requires the district courts
to set dates for oral argument on their own initiative. Finally, the new rules
are silent on the validity of the dismissal for lack of prosecution.
THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING IN

Wood

The Wyoming Supreme Court relied upon two rationales to support its
holding that the district courts had no power to dismiss perfected appeals
for lack of prosecution. 47 The court decided first that rule 6.01 of the
W.R.A.P. controlled and required the district court to set an oral argument
date. Wood therefore had no responsibility to request a date and could not
be dismissed for his failure to do so.41
Second, the court reasoned that Wagner and Shafsky were no longer
authority for continued district court dismissals for lack of prosecution
because those cases had been decided under the trial de novo procedure.
The review procedures of the W.R.A.P. and rule 23 of the W.R.Cr.P.J.C.
were different enough, the court felt, to warrant a reversal of the Wagner
rule. 4 9 Unfortunately, the court did not explain which aspects of the change
in procedure most influenced its Wood holding.
The supreme court relied on Mullen as support for its notice dictum.
The court did not explain how Mullen applied but simply cited the case after
stating: "[W]e hold that... [the district court] has no authority to dismiss
for lack of prosecution in the absence of reasonable notice which would
have the effect of advising the appellant that it is necessary that a hearing
be requested before the district court.' 'r
ANALYSIS

Rule 6.01 of the W.R.A.P. as a Rationalefor the Wood Holding
It does not appear that the Wyoming Supreme Court really employed
rule 6.01 of the W.R.A.P. to reach its Wood reversal. The court instead
44. W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 27.
45. W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 5.01.
46. W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 6.
47. 660 P.2d at 1166.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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used rule 6.01 to endorse a conclusion that it reached for other, weightier
reasons. The court could easily have accepted the City's interpretation of
rule 6.01; an interpretation which allowed continued district court
dismissals for lack of prosecution.51 The City quoted rule 6.01 in its brief:
The clerk will notify counsel by mail or telephone of cases set for
hearing. Counsel for either or all of the parties, when wishing to
submit a case upon briefs, may avoid personal attendance at court
by filing a written direction to the clerk to so submit upon briefs. A
motion to postpone a hearing beyond the time assigned may be
heard without argument in the discretion of the court, but a
reasonable time may be allowed 2upon request for a showing by a
party for or against the motion.6
The City then noted that rule 6.01 required the clerk to inform counsel of
the date set for oral argument, but did not necessarily remove the appellant's duty to request that date in the first place. Thus the appellant's
duty to request a date for argument and the dismissal sanction enforcing
that duty could be consistent with rule 6.01."
The supreme court did not accept the City's seemingly valid argument
but instead agreed with Wood that "the effect of rule 6.01, W.R.A.P., is to
impose upon the court and its clerk the duties of setting the case for hearing. . .. ,,"4 Whether its reliance upon rule 6.01 was sound or not, the fact
remains that the court specifically intended that its argument based on that
rule justify its holding that district courts had no authority to dismiss
perfected intermediate appeals for lack of prosecution.56 Moreover, since
the rule 6.01 rationale has no application to the court's notice discussion, its
inclusion in the opinion is evidence that the notice holding is really dictum.
If the supreme court had relied entirely upon rule 6.01 to support its
holding in Wood, then the case would carry little precedential value. As we
have seen, rule 6.01 no longer applies to intermediate appeals because the
Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
are now the sole rules governing those appeals. 5 6 The new rules contain no
provision remotely similar to rule 6.01. A future appellant, who has not requested oral argument in a timely fashion, and who is threatened with
dismissal by the district judge, will have to argue that Wood prohibits the
dismissal even though rule 6.01 no longer applies to intermediate appeals.
He will have to argue that Wood prohibits the dismissal because the
supreme court had a second rationale.
The Changefrom Trialsde Novo to Review Proceduresas a Rationalefor the
Wood Holding
The supreme court's one-sentence discussion of the change from a trial
de novo system to a review procedure is excellent evidence that the court
intended, in Wood, to completely eliminate dismissals for lack of prosecution from intermediate appeals. "We distinguish," the court announced,
51. Brief for Appellee at 10-11, Wood v. City of Casper, 660 P.2d 1163 (Vyo. 1983).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 660 P.2d at 1166.
55. See id.
56. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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"Shafsky v. City of Casper, supra, and the cases cited therein [Wagner]
simply by virture of the adjustment from a trial de novo procedure to a
review procedure. ' 57 If the court intended to allow continued dismissals,
but require reasonable notice to appellants, then the distinction was unnecessary. As we have seen, the appellant in Shafsky was given advance
warning of his duty to request a date for oral argument.5 8 On the contrary,
Wood received no such notice. The supreme court could have distinguished
Wood from Shafsky on the basis of notice if the court viewed notice as the
key to its holding. Shafsky would have remained good law and the court
would still have reversed Wood's dismissal. Instead, the court ignored the
possible notice distinction.
The manner in which the supreme court distinguished Shafsky from
Wood is more than just evidence of the court's intended holding. The differences between Shafsky's trial de novo and Wood's review procedure
prompted the court to overrule Shafsky and hold that district courts had no
power to dismiss perfected appeals for lack of prosecution.5 9 Specifically,
the review procedures, first adopted by rule 23 of the W.R.Cr.P.J.C. in
1975, removed the adversarial trial de novo which had led the Wagner court
to assume that only parties could request a trial date.60 The review procedures also altered the relative burdens of appeal shouldered by appellants, prosecutors and district courts. Together these major
developments produced the Wood decision.
The Shifting of Burdens Under the Review Procedures
An appellant proceeding under either rule 23 or the W.R.A.P. faced
greater obstacles than did appellants granted trials de novo under the old
system. Rule 23 and the W.R.A.P. both required appellants to file briefs,
and those briefs were restricted to allegations of error. The trial de novo,
on the other hand, allowed a fresh presentation of all the evidence. Thus
prosecutors had to prove their cases again at the trial de novo, whereas
prosecutors operating under the review procedures simply had to show
that no harmful error occurred below. Finally, appellants taking trials de
novo had plenty of time to make their points to either judge or jury while
appellants were limited, under the W.R.A.P., to thirty minutes of argument before a judge.6 1
The review procedure of both rule 23 and the W.R.A.P. reduced the
burdens of intermediate appeals on the district courts. Removal of the jury
trial option allowed the district court judges to review the briefs and
transcripts, hear oral argument, and then decide the cases. The judges
could fit oral argument into their docketing schedules more easily than they
could the time-consuming trials de novo.
In summary, the change to review procedures increased the difficulties
that appellants faced on appeal while it decreased the burdens on district
courts and prosecutors. This is not to say that appellants could no longer
57. 660 P.2d at 1166.
58. See supra text accompanying note 25.
59. See 660 P.2d at 1166.
60. See supra text accompanying note 19.
61. W.R.A.P. 6.02.
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unfairly delay appeals. They could still intentionally shirk their duty to request a timely date for oral argument. Nevertheless, it made sense for the
Wood court to search for a mechanism to prevent delay which was less
drastic than the dismissal for lack of prosecution.
PreventingDelay through District Court Docket Control
The change from the trial de novo to review procedures suggested a
means, less draconian than dismissal, which the district courts could
employ to prevent delay. Because intermediate appeals no longer occurred
as trials, the need for an adversary to request a date for oral argument
became less pronounced. The American Bar Association has recognized
that criminal appeals should be managed by the courts rather than by the
parties. An A.B.A. standard for criminal appeals states: "Continuing,
authoritative supervision of criminal cases on appeal, from docketing
through submission for decision, should be exercised by the appellate
court."6 2 The commentary on the standard is even more relevant:
The traditional adversary system relies on the initiatives of counsel
for the parties to take the action necessary to move a case forward
in accordance with the expected schedule of steps for an appeal.
This standard, departing from this customary arrangement,
recognizes a duty on the appellate court actively to manage its own
caseload in the preparatory stages of appeals.68
If the Wood court intended to eliminate dismissals for lack of prosecution, and still prevent delay, it could have achieved both by requiring the
district courts to set oral argument dates. The court, however, declined to
require district courts to do so. Wood was decided, the court claimed,
"[w]ithout regard to any philosophical differences about the management
of court dockets .... -6 4 Nevertheless, the very fact that the court disclaimed a docket control purpose indicates that the court realized its holding implied greater docket control by the district courts. In other words, the
supreme court likely foresaw that district courts would have to set dates
for oral argument because they could no longer prevent delay by dismissing
appeals.
In conclusion, the supreme court's distinction between the trial de novo
and the review procedures evidenced the court's intent to eliminate
dismissals for lack of prosecution entirely. The shifting of greater
preliminary burdens onto appellants, and the concept of increased docket
control in the district courts, support the elimination of dismissals; which
should be seen as the holding in Wood.
The Court's Notice Holding as Dictum
One of the two apparent holdings offered by the Wyoming Supreme
Court in Wood must be dictum. 65 The decision cannot completely eliminate
dismissals for lack of prosecution and still allow the dismissals accompanied
62. Standards for Criminal Justice S 21-3.1 (1978).
63. Id. at commentary 37-38.
64. 660 P.2d at 1166.
65. See supra note 4 for the full texts of the conflicting holdings.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1984

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 19 [1984], Iss. 1, Art. 17
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIX

by reasonable notice. We have seen that complete elimination of the sanction has substantial support in the opinion and made good sense under the
review system. The notice holding, on the other hand, should not have been
addressed by the court at all. It has no viable support in Mullen,, and
deserves to be labelled as dictum.
Wood claimed in his brief that the district court abused its discretion
when it failed to notify him of his duty to request a date for oral
argument. 66 The City responded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion because Mullen only required a fair hearing on the motion to
dismiss. The City also noted that no court rules required the kind of advance notice for which Wood argued.67 The supreme court was responding
directly to these abuse of discretion arguments when it stated that the
district court could dismiss Wood's appeal as long as it gave Wood advance
notice of his duty to request a date for oral argument. Yet at the end of the
opinion the court disclaimed any attention to the alleged abuse of discretion. "[T]here is no need," the court pronounced, "for us to consider the
contention of the appellant that there was an abuse of discretion on the
part of the district court. The district court had no authority, discretionary
or otherwise, to dismiss this appeal." 6 8 The court's statement is strong
evidence that it did not view the notice issue, presented by the parties as an
abuse of discretion, as important. The court would have avoided the confusing effect of the notice dictum if it had truly ignored the abuse of discretion
claims.
Mullen v. City of Cheyenne was the sole support mustered by the court
for its notice dictum.6 9 Yet Mullen does not support that dictum. The
supreme court held in Mullen that a district court could dismiss an appeal
for lack of prosecution even if it failed to notify the appellant in advance
that he had to request a trial de novo date. The Mullen court reversed the
district court's dismissal only because Mullen did not receive a fair hearing
on the prosecutor's motion to dismiss.70 The supreme court, in Wood,
misinterpreted Mullen. The court apparently felt that Mullen prohibited
dismissal unless the district court gave the appellant both a fair hearing on
the motion to dismiss and advance notice of his duty to request a trial de
novo date. 71 Attorneys and district courts should not have to contend with
the Mullen misreading because the court's notice holding, which the
misreading supports, is only dictum.
In sum, only one holding makes sense in Wood. Moreover, the weight of
the evidence indicates that the supreme court intended that holding. Wood
stands for the proposition that a district court has no power whatsoever to
dismiss an intermediate appeal because of an appellant's failure to request
a date for oral argument.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Brief for Appellant, supra note 7, at 17.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 51, at 13.
660 P.2d at 1167.
See supra text accompanying note 50.
493 P.2d at 1044.
The Wood court did not flesh out its interpretation of Mu//en. Nevertheless, the citation
to the case after its notice dictum indicates that the court misinterpreted Mu//en. See
supra text accompanying note 50.
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CASE NOTES

The Viability of the Wood Holding under the Wyoming Rules of Appellate
Procedurefor Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
The Wyoming Supreme Court decided Wood while fully aware that it
would be the last analysis of an intermediate appeal under either rule 23 or
the W.R.A.P.7 2 The W.R.A.P.C.L.J. had, as the court deliberated,
eliminated the W.R.A.P. from intermediate appeals and had expressly
superseded rule 23 of the W.R.Cr.P.J.C.1a Thus, if rule 6.01 of the
W.R.A.P. had been the only rationale for the Wood reversal, the case
would have no continued value. Wood remains valid, however, because the
supreme court based its holding on the distinction between the trial de novo
afforded Wagner, Shafsky and Mullen, and the review procedure that
Wood faced. The distinction has not changed under the W.R.A.P.C.L.J. If
anything, the review procedure under the new rules is even more removed
from the trial de novo concept than were the procedures embodied in rule
23 or the W.R.A.P. The new rules severely limit an appellant's chances to
present his allegations of error to the district court.7 4 On the other hand,
the rules greatly increase a district court's power to regulate the scope of
an intermediate appeal.75
An intermediate criminal appeal can be presented in three ways under
the W.R.A.P.C.L.J. First, the district judge may dispense with both oral
argument and briefs, and base his decision solely upon the record and the
appellant's statement of error. 76 The rules seem to prefer this least complete of the three possible processes. Rule 5.01, for example, states that
"[b]riefs shall not be filed by either party unless so ordered by the district
court." ' Similarly, rule 6 provides: "There shall be no oral arguments of
the appeal before the district court, unless the district judge directs otherwise."'7 8 Clearly, under this scenario, it makes no sense for a district judge
to dismiss the appeal for lack of prosecution. The appellant will have filed
his statement of error and trial record in response to deadlines set by the
rules.79 The judge will have all he needs to decide the case shortly after final
judgment below. Any further delay will be solely the court's fault.
The second scenario, in which the district judge dispenses with oral
argument but requires briefs, differs little from the first. The briefing
deadlines are spelled out in rule 5.06 and allow the appellant only twenty
days, after he files the trial record, in which to prepare his brief.8 0 Again
the district judge will not need the dismissal sanction to bring the case to
timely conclusion.
72. The court stated: "In this regard we do note that effective January 1, 1983, the Wyoming
Rules of Appellate Procedure for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, by Rule 27, superseded
the provisions of Rule 23, W.R. CR.P.J.C., and there would be no prospective conflict
such as that argued in this case." 660 P.2d at 1167.
73. W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 27.
74. This is especially true when the district courts exercise their options under the new rules
and eliminate oral argument and briefs. See infra text accompanying note 76.
75. W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 5.01, 6.
76. Id.
77. W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 5.01.
78. W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 6.
79. The appellant has twenty days after he files his notice of appeal in which to file the trial
record with the district court. W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 3.02. He has twenty days after filing the
record in which to file the statement of error. Id. 5.01(b), 5.06.
80. W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 5.01(a).
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Finally, the district judge may require briefs and oral argument just as
if the case had been appealed under the old rules. No deadline in the new
rules requires the appellant to make a timely request for an oral argument
date. Nor do the rules specify whether the court or the appellant should
first set the date. Conceivably, the district court could wait for the appellant to set the date and the appellant could ignore his duty to make a
timely request. Under Wood, the district court could not dismiss the appeal
for lack of prosecution despite the delay. The solution to this problem, the
same problem that led the Wagner court to establish the dismissal for lack
of prosecution, is for the district court to set a date for oral argument. The
district court must affirmatively order oral argument in the first place. 8' It
is only logical that the court set a tentative date when it issues the order.
District courts that do not adopt this practice have only themselves to
blame if delay occurs.
CONCLUSION

The district courts, and attorneys taking intermediate appeals to those
courts, should not be misled by the notice dictum in Wood. The Wyoming
Supreme Court actually held that district court dismissals of intermediate
appeals for lack of prosecution will not be tolerated. Wood has just as much
vitality under the W.R.A.P.C.L.J. as it had under the W.R.A.P. and rule 23
of the W.R.Cr.P.J.C. because the controlling rationale for the decision-namely, the distinction between trial de novo and review procedure-still survives under the new rules. Perhaps the court should have
gone farther and explicitly required district courts to set dates when they
order oral argument. In a sense, the court did so when it decided that rule
6.01 demanded that district court clerks set dates for oral argument. But
rule 6.01 no longer applies to intermediate appeals so the court's 6.01
analysis is useless under the W.R.A.P.C.L.J. The Wyoming Supreme Court
has the power to amend the W.R.A.P.C.L.J. to include a rule explicitly requiring district courts to set dates for oral argument on those occasions
when the district courts order oral argument.82 The supreme court would
be well advised to adopt such an amendment.
PETER K. MICHAEL

81. W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 6.
82. Wyo. STAT. S 5-2-114 (1977).
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